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One of the principal dangers currently facing the world economy 
arises from the large and unsustainable imbalances in current 
account  positions.  Some  observers  argue  that  these  imbal-
ances will unwind gradually and nondisruptively, while others 
emphasize the risks of a sudden change of sentiment in financial 
markets that could result in an abrupt and damaging adjustment. 
No one knows which scenario will materialize, but a priority 
for policymakers should be to reduce the risks of a crisis, which 
could produce a world recession and disruptions to the global 
trading system. For that, the global economy requires official 
sponsorship of a credible, comprehensive adjustment program. 
This policy brief outlines such a program.
Section 1 presents why the current situation is unsustain-
able. Adjustment must take place and will require significant 
movements in exchange rates. Section 2 argues that adjustment 
induced by policy actions is more likely to be orderly than one 
initiated by financial markets. We view the current stalemate 
regarding policy actions as dangerous, as financial-market partic-
ipants are likely to change their minds at some stage about the 
sustainability of imbalances unless they see that the main players 
are able to agree on the direction of desirable policy changes. 
Section 3 presents estimates of the exchange rate implications 
of global current account adjustment from a variety of models. 
Section 4 describes the policy implications the authors of this 
brief drew from these results and the workshop discussions.
WHY THE CURRENT SITUATION 
IS UNSUSTAINABLE
There has been a great deal of discussion recently of global current 
account imbalances. Much of the attention has focused on the 
historically large US current account deficit, which, according to 
the US Bureau of Economic Analysis, reached $857 billion (6.5 
percent of GDP) in 2006. The counterpart to this deficit can be 
found mainly in Asia and the oil-exporting countries. Accord-
ing to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), China’s surplus 
swelled to an estimated $184 billion (7.2 percent of GDP) in 
2006,1 while Japan recorded an estimated surplus of $167 billion 
(3.7 percent of GDP) last year. High oil prices propelled the 
surplus for countries in the Middle East to $282 billion last 
year. 
1. This estimate appears conservative. China’s trade surplus in goods was $178 
billion in 2006, with imports reported on a cost, insurance, freight (c.i.f) basis. 
When the import data are adjusted to free on board (f.o.b.), the trade in goods 
surplus will likely come in at about $215 billion. Based on trends in the other 
items in the first-half balance of payments, Nicholas Lardy estimates that China’s 
surplus last year was $240 billion (see Nicholas Lardy,  Toward a Consumption-
Driven Growth Path, Policy Briefs in International Economics PB06-6, Washing-
ton: Peterson Institute for International Economics, October 2006).
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A continuing leitmotif of the Six Party Talks—among the United 
States, China, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and North Korea—is 
the prospect that a resolution of the nuclear question could set 
the stage for more institutionalized and enduring multilateral 
cooperation in Northeast Asia. The Joint Statement of September 
19, 2005, which outlined the principles governing subsequent 
negotiations, referenced new “ways and means for promoting 
security cooperation in northeast Asia,” and the February 13, 
2007 Joint Statement created a Working Group on a Northeast 
Asia Peace and Security Mechanism (NEAPSM). 
From the beginning, these aspirations have included a strong 
economic  component.  The  September  2005  Joint  Statement 
invoked “economic cooperation in the fields of energy, trade and 
investment, bilaterally and/or multilaterally.” The February 2007 
Joint  Statement  explicitly  referenced  humanitarian  assistance 
to North Korea as well and created an Economy and Energy 
Cooperation Working Group. Although initially focused on the 
delivery of heavy fuel oil and its equivalents to North Korea, this 
working group could become the locus for wider economic coop-
eration and thus complement the security agenda. 
The benefits from integrating North Korea into the regional 
economy  do  not  necessarily  point  to  a  central  role  for  the 
NEAPSM,  however.  These  objectives  might  also  be  achieved 
through  other  multilateral  institutions,  including  the  interna-
tional financial institutions, or through regional or bilateral aid 
and trade and investment agreements. Moreover, it is not clear 
that the economic agenda of any new multilateral institution 
should focus solely or even primarily on North Korea; to the 
contrary, we argue that for such a body to be robust it should 
engage the interests of all the six parties. 
In this brief, we explore the economic dimension of multi-
lateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia. We begin with a 
discussion of the purported security benefits of economic engage-
ment with North Korea. We then outline recent economic devel-
opments in North Korea, which provide a crucial background 
to any discussion of the issue. We raise some cautionary ques-
tions about the scope for multilateral economic cooperation in 
Northeast Asia before outlining how economic cooperation can 
complement long-run security and economic objectives on the 
peninsula, including economic reform in North Korea. 
The BenefiTs of economic engagemenT
A  central  objective  of  any  security  and  peace  mechanism  for 
Northeast  Asia  should  be  to  integrate  North  Korea  into  the 
regional  economy.  The  advantages  of  economic  integration—
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which undergirds the Sunshine Policy of Kim Dae-jung and 
the concept of “engagement”—are worth elaborating as they 
involve a number of tradeoffs. 
First, regional economic integration creates valued econ- 
omic assets, physical infrastructure, and trade in a potential 
war zone. Deeper economic integration would therefore create 
cross-cutting pressures on a North Korean military strategy 
that  has  emphasized  forward-deployed  conventional  forces. 
The location of the Kaesong Industrial Complex, rail and road 
crossings, and the proposed joint economic zone surrounding 
the Northern Limit Line and economic cooperation project at 
Haeju all reflect such a calculus, as can be seen by military 
reticence about them on both sides of the border. 
Second, increased economic integration could coax the 
North Koreans to engage in the security dialogue and over the 
long run might generate broader economic stakes in political 
cooperation.  However,  these  effects  should  not  be  exagger-
ated. To date, the use of economic carrots appears to have had 
surprisingly little effect on North Korea’s bargaining behavior; 
if anything, the evidence suggests that North Korea is more 
forthcoming when facing economic constraints.1 
The  long-run  effects  of  economic  integration  will  also 
depend on the nature of the economic ties that develop and 
can by no means be taken for granted. Experience throughout 
the world demonstrates that aid can leverage reform or support 
temporizing behavior, depending on how transfers are designed 
and the attitude of the recipient government. In a country such 
as North Korea, even nominally private economic exchanges 
can be monopolized by the state and military sector and provide 
fungible resources that support the regime. Private investment 
confined to zones (Kaesong Industrial Complex) or particular 
projects (Mt. Kumgang) may or may not have broader political 
implications. 
Third,  increased  economic  integration  is  likely  to  be 
the  sine  qua  non  of  a  successful  economic  transformation 
of North Korea. It is often argued that North Korea should 
pursue a Chinese or Vietnamese model, but this analogy is 
subtly misleading. Although agricultural price and land tenure 
reforms are certainly worth undertaking, they are unlikely to 
provide the same impetus to the broader reform effort that 
they did in China. Even more than in China, North Korea’s 
transformation will depend on foreign investment, trade, and 
remittances—in effect, a strategy similar to that pursued by 
South Korea from the mid-1960s or Vietnam from the 1990s.
1. The financial constraints on North Korea associated with the designation of 
Banco Delta Asia (BDA) as a money laundering concern by the United States 
in September 2005 were a major preoccupation of the North Korean govern-
ment and may have even triggered the missile and nuclear tests of 2006. The 
resolution of the BDA “sanctions” in January 2007 was central to restarting 
the Six Party Talks.
Moreover, it is important to point out that to the extent 
such  reforms  are  successful,  they  have  highly  ambiguous 
consequences for the political transformation of the country. 
Successful  economic  reforms  may  have  long-run  political 
consequences but could well stabilize the regime in the short 
run.  Indeed,  among  some  strategic  thinkers  in  both  South 
Korea and China, a central objective of engagement is precisely 
to avoid regime or even state collapse. 
Economic engagement is further complicated, finally, by 
purely humanitarian concerns. North Korea is desperately poor 
and has recently experienced a slowdown in growth, a decline 
in food assistance, and ongoing food shortages. Sadly, North 
Korea will continue to need humanitarian assistance for some 
time to come regardless of what happens in the Six Party Talks. 
No matter how well designed, such assistance will inevitably 
have ambiguous effects on regime change as well. 
The norTh Korean economy: 
a Brief economic hisTory
North  Korea’s  recent  economic  history  provides  further 
insight  into  the  prospects  for  deeper  economic  integration. 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the North Korean 
economy went into a steep decline, culminating in one of the 
most destructive famines of the 20th century (Haggard and 
Noland 2007a). As many as one million people—5 percent 
of  the  entire  population—perished  in  the  mid-1990s.  As 
this occurred, however, the North Korean economy began to 
undergo a profound transformation, what we call “marketiza-
tion from below.” Households, work units, local party organs, 
government  offices,  and  even  military  units  scrambled  for 
food, initiating barter trade and venturing into new, monetized 
economic activities. 
The North Korean regime’s response to this “marketiza-
tion from below” has been both slow and ambivalent. It was 
not until July 2002 that reforms decriminalized some of the 
market activities that had sprung up during the famine, for 
example,  by  permitting  the  growth  of  controlled  markets. 
However, in 2005, in the wake of increased aid and improved 
harvests, the government imposed a ban on private trade in 
grain, which had emerged as the principal source of food for 
most households, and attempted to resuscitate the failed public 
distribution system. The government has tried to force work-
ers back into the collapsing state-owned enterprise sector, for 
example, by restricting the ability of women to work as traders. 
Most recently, it has apparently cracked down on unregulated 
activities of North Korean trading firms in China. 
The sympathetic interpretation of these moves is that they 
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practices out of the chaotic environment that emerged follow-
ing both the famine and the 2002 reforms. But a disturbing 
aspect of recent history has been the government’s tendency 
to liberalize under duress and to reassert control when times 
are good. It is fair to say that the government has not funda-
mentally embraced the reform process and that, as a result, 
economic policy suffers from debilitating credibility problems; 
it is difficult for both North Koreans and foreigners to invest 
with confidence—at least at any significant scale—if the policy 
environment  remains  highly  uncertain.2  The  North  Korean 
emphasis on “military-first” politics further limits the scope 
of the reforms by continuing to tilt the overall allocation of 
resources in favor of the military.3 
The extent of economic liberalization has also been disap-
pointing. As we have argued, agricultural reforms are unlikely 
to be as central to North Korea’s transformation as they were 
in China and Vietnam. Instead, given the relatively smaller size 
of North Korea’s agricultural sector, and its proximity to larger, 
more advanced economies, foreign investment and multilateral 
assistance in support of increased trade are the sine qua non 
of genuine economic transformation. Investment and exports 
will finance not only the imports needed to revive the North 
Korean economy but also the food that has continued to be in 
short supply since the famine.
However, the relatively limited scope of policy reform does 
not imply the absence of foreign trade and investment ties; to 
the contrary, North Korea’s external economic relations have 
been increasing steadily, with two countries—China and South 
Korea—playing the most central role (Haggard and Noland 
2007b). 
The onset of the nuclear crisis may have given an unin-
tended boost to North Korea’s ties with China’s booming econ-
omy. The crisis generated uncertainty, multilateral sanctions, an 
effective Japanese embargo, and US financial sanctions. Sanc-
tions may have pushed North Korea back to the bargaining 
table, but in combination they also had the unintended effect 
of linking North Korea even more closely with China. This 
deepening integration has not primarily taken the form of aid, 
which we estimate has remained constant since the late 1990s. 
2. The economic situation is not uniformly negative, however. For example, 
over the past year or so, the rate of inflation, which had been running well 
over 100 percent annually, while remaining high, has declined. 
3. For an analysis of the military’s expanding role in the North Korean 
economy under the songun policy, see Toloraya (2008), who argues that the 
military opposes economic reform and marketization. Yet the existing military 
leadership could be a beneficiary of reform and opening. North Korea could 
experience a large “peace dividend” if its million-man army were partially 
demobilized and put to work on civilian projects such as the rehabilitation 
of infrastructure. At least some of the military leadership could reinvent 
themselves as businessmen. See Noland (2000, 302–303) for a quantitative 
assessment.
Rather,  growing  interdependence  has  rested  on  expanding 
trade and investment, driven by small traders and state-owned 
and  private  enterprises  particularly  from  China’s  northeast 
and reflecting China’s voracious appetite for raw materials. As 
figure 1 shows, China’s trade with North Korea has expanded 
steadily since the onset of the nuclear crisis. Exports to North 
Korea have also outstripped its imports, implying a bilateral 
trade deficit financed in part by growing foreign direct invest-
ment by Chinese enterprises.
South  Korea’s  trade  and  investment  relations  with  the 
North have been driven more directly by politics. Trade did 
not begin in earnest until the initiation of the Sunshine Policy 
under Kim Dae-jung and from the beginning had a strong aid 
and noncommercial component. Yet even nominally commer-
cial trade has a substantial strategic and noncommercial cast. 
The Mt. Kumgang tourism project and the Kaesong Industrial 
Complex have involved private companies but also substantial 
government subsidies. Moreover, both are confined to enclosed 
zones with uncertain spillover effects. 
Figure 2 divides South Korea’s exports to the North into 
three  categories—  commercial  trade,  cooperation  projects 
(primarily  Mt.  Kumgang  and  Kaesong),  and  noncommer-
cial  trade  or  aid—and  compares  them  with  our  estimates 
of Chinese aid. Between 1995 and 2007, South Korea’s aid 
and  economic  cooperation  activities  together  have  at  times 
accounted for almost 60 percent of total trade and averaged 
more than 0 percent of trade over this period. Aid and other 
noncommercial exports from South Korea have increasingly 
outstripped even our highest estimates of Chinese aid. Under 
the government of newly elected President Lee Myung-bak, the 
relative magnitudes of these noncommercial transactions could 
decrease as South Korean policy begins to emphasize “trade not 
aid” in its dealings with the North.5 Ironically, to date, social-
. More recently, an unknown share of this activity may reflect transactions 
with South Korean firms operating in the border region with Chinese partners. 
5. The humanitarian share may actually increase in the short run if North 
Korean recalcitrance on the nuclear issue is met with a slowdown in all but 
humanitarian aid flows. Similarly, cooperation projects involve sunk costs and 
will likely decline in importance—unless the nuclear issue is resolved. If it 
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ist China appears more commercial in its dealings with North 
Korea than capitalist South Korea. 
How might North Korea’s incipient opening be further 
advanced through a multilateral framework? How should such 
a mechanism be designed, and what should its agenda be? 
mulTilaTeralism: four caveaTs
Multilateral  institutions  are  well-suited  to  circumstances  in 
which there are inefficiencies in traditional, bilateral diplomacy 
or  coordination  problems  that  require  cooperation  among 
multiple  parties.  Such  multilateral  institutions  have  proven 
their merit in a range of settings, from the global to the regional. 
In the Northeast Asian context, the Six Party Talks have proven 
remarkably resilient. Despite the slow pace of negotiations, 
none of the parties appear willing to abandon them altogether, 
and all have signaled a willingness to discuss a more endur-
ing multilateral mechanism. Moreover, the economic weight 
of the six parties and the spate of bilateral and regional trade 
agreements in the Asia-Pacific raise the question of whether 
Northeast Asia may be ripe for deeper economic cooperation 
and integration.
were to be resolved, ambitious infrastructure investment from the South could 
“lead” private investment into the North, with the share of noncommercial 
transactions also increasing over the short run. 
However, it is important to begin with some reservations. 
Some caution is warranted about what a multilateral mecha-
nism can achieve on the economic front, and there are serious 
questions about the appropriate focus for such an entity. 
First, the advance of multilateral cooperation hinges on 
the resolution of the nuclear question: Multilateral economic 
diplomacy cannot move ahead of the more difficult discussions 
of security as they have in other regions. The reasons are not 
simply tactical: that the five parties should withhold carrots 
until  North  Korea  shows  its  willingness  to  cooperate.  The 
reasons have to do with the fact that closer economic integra-
tion, including foreign investment, is unlikely to take off if the 
nuclear question and broader security issues are not moving 
toward resolution. 
Second,  it  is  important  to  avoid  a  top-down  planning 
approach to multilateral economic cooperation and to empha-
size the significance of reform and the private sector. A number 
of  think  tanks  and  academics  in  the  region  have  advanced 
vision documents with respect to Northeast Asian economic 
integration,  and  the  recent  summit  brought  a  number  of 
specific “cooperation projects” to the bargaining table. Even 
President Lee Myung-bak has advanced a proposal for ambi-
tious infrastructure investment in the North. But the Tumen 
River project provides a case study of how well-intentioned 
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Figure 1    China–North Korea trade, 2000–2007
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Source: Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, 007, available at www.mofcom.gov.cn (accessed on April 1, 008). N u m b e r   Pb0 8 - 4                                                                                                                                                                                       A PrI L   2 0 0 8

mentary domestic policies and underlying economic feasibility. 
Similarly, the efforts by the Korean Peninsula Energy Devel-
opment Organization (KEDO) to provide North Korea with 
light water reactors—whatever their political merits—proved 
a  complete  white  elephant  from  an  economic  perspective. 
Multilateral cooperation on expensive infrastructure, such as 
pipelines and the energy grid, might be warranted over the 
long run. But beginning with such initiatives may skew the 
discussion away from much-needed reforms and send mislead-
ing signals to North Korea given the vast resources such proj-
ects would demand. 
A  first  corollary  of  the  injunction  to  avoid  top-down 
approaches  is  that  any  collective  development  assistance 
must be extended in support of economic reform. Experience 
throughout the developing world demonstrates that assistance 
will have only marginal effects and may even have negative 
consequences  if  not  coupled  with  policy  changes.  It  is  not 
simply that aid sustains the regime; since aid is fungible, even 
purely humanitarian aid will have that effect. The problem is 
that too much aid can delay or even undermine the reform 
process. Whatever the multilateral mechanism that ultimately 
emerges, it should encourage reform and economic opening in 
the North. 
A second corollary of the injunction against top-down 
approaches is the importance of engaging the private sector: 
through trade, foreign direct investment, private capital flows 
(including remittances), and sheer expertise. Economic reha-
bilitation will require investment in social overhead capital, 
which will be led primarily by the public sector. But if North 
Korea  is  to  evolve  toward  a  self-sustaining  market-oriented 
economy, private-sector involvement will be crucial. Partici-
pation of foreign firms means that projects are subject to the 
market test of profitability, and it encourages North Korean 
authorities to think of economic engagement in terms of joint 
gain rather than as political tribute. 
Public-sector initiatives, and even subsidies, can support 
private investment in various ways. Examples include multilat-
eral assistance for the development of export processing zones 
and  engaging  South  Korean  institutions  such  as  the  Korea 
Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA) and the Korea 
Ex-Im Bank in North Korea. 
But many discussions of the rehabilitation of the North 
Korean economy have overemphasized public investment and 
have failed to consider the crucial complementarities between 
public-sector investment, economic reform, and the engage-
ment of the private sector. At least some of the massive costs 
of modernizing the North Korean economy can be born by 
the private sector through foreign direct investment if North 
Korea makes it attractive to do business. This is even true with 
respect to infrastructure, where a number of developing coun-
tries have benefited from private investment in projects ranging 
from telecommunications to highways and even the provision 
millions of US dollars
Figure 2    Chinese  and South Korean aid and exports to North Korea, 1993–2007
Note: High Chinese aid estimate is the sum of all food and fuel exports to North Korea; low is officially reported data 
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of power and water. The involvement of the private sector both 
contributes to the revitalization of the country and constitutes 
a natural hedge with respect to the costs of unification. 
Over the medium run, there is also a role for commercial 
lending. The North Korean government will eventually seek to 
resolve the overhang from its past international defaults (prob-
ably with South Korean government assistance) and reenter 
international capital markets as a borrower. Such borrowing 
has been important in financing infrastructural development 
in Vietnam once reform makes such investments viable. Put 
simply,  aid  is  not  enough;    foreign  direct  investment  and 
commercial lending need to supplement public support.
 A third reservation about a regional multilateral mecha-
nism is that it should not duplicate at the regional level what 
might be more effectively managed through existing multi-
lateral institutions. North Korea is in need of depoliticized 
technical  assistance  for  a  whole  panoply  of  issues  running 
from the mundane but critical, such as developing meaning-
ful national statistical capabilities, through basic agricultural 
and health technologies, to social infrastructure of a modern 
economy. This infrastructure includes policy mechanisms to 
manage macroeconomic policy, including through reform of 
the central bank; specify property rights and resolve commer-
cial disputes; regulate markets, including financial markets as 
they emerge; establish and implement international trade and 
investment policies; and so on.6 
The possibility of a Northeast Asian Development Bank 
has  been  floated  as  a  vehicle  for  undertaking  these  tasks. 
However, it would be a mistake to try to create an institution 
at the subregional level that would duplicate the activities of 
existing global and regional institutions in which the five other 
countries are well-represented. Moreover, North Koreans could 
interpret such an institution  as being a little more than a dedi-
cated channel for assistance. To the extent that the five govern-
6. We have made the same argument about duplicating multilateral ef-
forts with respect to humanitarian assistance as well. For better or worse, 
humanitarian assistance to North Korea is highly politicized and reflects strong 
domestic political commitments in China and, in particular, in South Korea. 
From the standpoint of efficiency, however, the overall aid mission would 
be better served by channeling more Chinese and South Korean assistance 
through multilateral institutions such as the World Food Program. See Hag-
gard and Noland (2007a, chapter 6) for further elaboration. 
ments have particular expertise that they wish to contribute to 
North Korean economic rehabilitation, staff can be seconded 
to existing institutions, as was done in the case of KEDO or 
bilaterally as the North Koreans allow it.
Rather, such advice will be facilitated by North Korea’s 
entry into the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), 7 and the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) and an expansion of the activi-
ties of agencies currently engaged in North Korea, such as the 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the World 
Health Organization (WHO), and the United Nations Chil-
dren’s Fund (UNICEF). In our view, the sooner this happens, 
the better.8 
We can imagine a model in which the World Bank would 
play a coordinating but not exclusive role. The Bank would 
engage in more detailed analysis of the North Korean economy 
and  lead  a  consultative  group  on  the  country  to  facilitate 
multilateral assistance. The Bank could also become the reposi-
tory for a dedicated North Korea fund, which would initially 
support technical assistance and the building of local institu-
tional capacity. These early actions would eventually support 
direct  lending  and  investment  guarantee  activity.  Japanese 
postcolonial claims payments could be one source of financing 
for such a facility as the two countries normalize relations.9 
Calibration on the basis of Vietnam’s experience in joining the 
World Bank suggests that the North Koreans might expect 
an eventual lending program on the order of $150 million to 
$250 million annually; given South Korea’s interest in revital-
7. It is sometimes suggested that North Korea join the ADB before joining the 
World Bank, since Bank membership is contingent on joining the IMF and 
ADB membership is not. Again, the specifics of membership accession could 
take many forms, but the important point is that ADB membership not be 
used to duck the more rigorous accession process of the larger Bretton Woods 
institutions. In any event, North Korea’s potential membership at the ADB 
would depend on reaching a political accommodation with the United States 
and Japan, its two largest shareholders, whatever the formal technicalities; this 
is true with respect to observer status at the WTO as well.
8. Normally, members are granted observer status as a transitional status dur-
ing accession negotiations. In some unusual circumstances typically involving 
postconflict or new states (the Palestinian Authority, post-Khmer Rouge 
Cambodia, and East Timor), direct lending activities began before full mem-
bership, and this arrangement is sometimes floated for North Korea. Whatever 
the specific arrangements, it is important that observer status not be exploited 
as a permanent mechanism to sidestep membership obligations. Rather it 
should be a genuinely temporary state en route to full membership driven by 
the North Korean government’s embrace of reform and opening.
9.  Japanese officials have not denied formulas reported in the press that would 
put the total value of a multiyear package of grants, low-interest rate loans, 
and trade credits at approximately $10 billion, consistent with the value of 
Japan’s 1965 settlement with South Korea, appropriately adjusted for inflation 
and other factors. Japan will certainly argue that its $1 billion contribution 
to KEDO should be credited against this bill, and it has been speculated that 
Japan might even claim credit for the costs of recapitalizing failed Chochon-
gryun-affiliated financial institutions. See Noland (200) for further details 
and references.
A central objective of any 
security and peace mechanism 
for Northeast Asia should be to 
integrate North Korea into the 
regional and global economies.N u m b e r   Pb0 8 - 4                                                                                                                                                                                       A PrI L   2 0 0 8
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izing North Korea and the prospects of Japanese postcolonial 
payments, the actual lending from such a facility might be 
substantially larger.10 
A fourth and final caveat with respect to multilateralism 
is that the five parties are going to pursue their own foreign 
economic policies with respect to North Korea. A multilat-
eral setting can be useful in demonstrating common interests 
among the five parties—such as the significance of denuclear-
ization—they clearly diverge on a range of questions, from the 
merely tactical to the strategic; multilateralism will not resolve 
these differences but will rather have to accommodate them. 
Japan is not currently in the mood to play the financial role 
it did with respect to KEDO; further economic engagement 
clearly rests on the outcome of negotiations over normalization 
and, in particular, on the abduction question. 
Once  the  issue  of  North  Korea’s  nuclear  declaration 
is resolved, the US role with respect to economic questions 
will focus on removing North Korea from the terrorist list, 
terminating the application of the International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act (the successor to the Trading with the 
Enemy Act), removing remaining sanctions, and normalizing 
political relations. At some later stage, and depending on the 
course of North Korea’s political and economic reforms, the 
United States might contemplate rules of origin that would 
permit  imports  from  South  Korea  that  were  processed  in 
Kaesong or even granting North Korea normal trade relations 
(née most-favored nation status). These steps clearly lie in the 
future, however, and except for humanitarian assistance, US 
aid is likely to be modest. 
Russia has a stake in the North Korean economy and has 
been given leadership of the working group on the new security 
and peace mechanism. But Russia is not likely to be a major 
donor either. 
The two central players on the economic front are China 
and  South  Korea.  As  we  have  already  noted,  China  has  a 
growing economic stake in North Korea. This stake is largely 
commercial but supplemented by aid, which acts as both a lever 
and a hedge against the refugee problems that would emerge 
were North Korea to undergo political upheaval or a recurrence 
of economic collapse. 
The missile and nuclear tests resulted in a suspension of 
South  Korea’s  humanitarian  assistance  to  North  Korea  (see 
figure 2). South Korea’s election of a conservative candidate is 
also likely to change the tone of engagement with the North 
at the margin. But support for humanitarian assistance, road 
and rail links, Kaesong, energy assistance, and other economic 
cooperation  projects  is  widespread  and  likely  to  continue. 
Indeed, the Lee Myung-bak transition team has outlined an 
10. See Noland (2000, 30–2) for discussion.
extraordinarily ambitious economic program, contingent on 
full denuclearization, which includes mobilization of a $0 
billion international fund for North Korea, support for road 
links and other infrastructure, and training (Foreign Affairs 
Unit, Office of the President Elect 2008). A centerpiece of 
President Lee’s strategy is to expand export-oriented invest-
ment in North Korea, an approach very much in line with the 
strategy we have articulated here. 
The economic componenT 




In turning to what might be done, we should first ask whether 
the North Korean tail should be wagging the Northeast Asian 
dog.  The  potential  gains  from  closer  economic  integration 
among the six parties, particularly in the areas immediately 
surrounding the Korean peninsula, are by no means limited 
to the gains from securing greater North Korean cooperation. 
Arguably, economic cooperation should not be tied to North 
Korea at all but should move directly toward discussions of a 
more wide-ranging Northeast Asian economic community. 
We also see several drawbacks to focusing solely on the 
Korean  peninsula,  including  the  difficulty  of  maintaining 
common interests once the nuclear issue is resolved and the 
political  drawbacks  vis-à-vis  North  Korea  of  an  entity  that 
could be construed primarily as an aid vehicle. Moreover, it is 
far from clear that the North Koreans see a multilateral mecha-
nism as a substantial inducement; although open to the idea, 
North Korean negotiators have placed much more substantial 
weight on key bilateral relationships, including normalization 
of relations with the United States. 
Rather,  discussions  of  the  mechanism  should  focus  on 
issues that are of both long- and short-run interest and provide 
benefits to all the six parties. These would be addressed with 
the understanding that North Korea can avail itself of these 
discussions as it takes the necessary decisions to do so. 
The most encompassing idea, and one vetted widely in 
South Korea, would be a Northeast Asian free trade area. Given 
the weight of the five parties in the Asia-Pacific economy, such a 
grouping would be a major step toward wider regional integra-
tion. This is a laudable long-term objective, but it overreaches. 
Both Japan and the United States have had problems reaching 
or ratifying bilateral agreements with South Korea. Russia has 
had difficulty even with the less demanding task of joining the 
WTO. China and Japan would have to achieve a breakthrough 
in political as well as economic relations, and Japan has consis-
tently run into domestic political resistance from agriculture N u m b e r   Pb0 8 - 4     A PrI L   2 0 0 8
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among other sectors to WTO-consistent free trade agreements. 
And as with other issues, North Korea has to date shown little 
interest in reform of this magnitude. At this stage, a frontal 
effort to move toward a Northeast Asian free trade area is less 
likely to yield fruit than a more incremental and less legalistic 
approach that builds on the Six Party Talk mechanism. 
A range of issues fit the idea of “variable speed geom-
etry” and are likely to garner early support as topics worthy 
of discussion. These include maritime and air transport (and 
its externalities), transborder environmental issues (acid rain, 
dust, and haze), and technical trade facilitation issues among 
the parties, such as customs clearance and regional support for 
new export-oriented industrial parks in North Korea. 
Two issues that deserve somewhat greater attention are 
ground transportation and energy. The continued economic 
growth of the Northeast will clearly depend in part on the 
ongoing development of the major transportation corridors in 
the region.11 Two of these are directly related to the integration 
of the Korean peninsula: the western corridor or Gyungui line, 
which would not only link North and South but also provide 
a rail link for South Korea to China, and the eastern corridor, 
which not only is of importance  to the impoverished east coast 
of North Korea but also could link both Koreas through Russia 
to  Europe.  The  investment  required  to  rehabilitate  North 
Korean rail infrastructure and to manage issues such as differ-
ences in track gauge are nontrivial. Yet all of the continental 
countries stand to benefit from such investments directly, and 
Japan would as well. Rail transport might therefore constitute 
a useful early issue for discussion, particularly given the fact 
that it is relatively undemanding on North Korea but could 
nonetheless yield easy returns. Similarly, multilateral support 
for an improvement of roads would get strong support from 
North Korea, China, South Korea, and Russia.
Energy shipments to North Korea have played a crucial 
role as a short-run inducement in the Six Party Talks.12 Energy 
cooperation  is  often  highlighted  as  one  that  could  benefit 
from broader multilateral cooperation, particularly given the 
11. Tsuji (2003) is a useful introduction to these issues. 
12. The February 2007 Joint Statement promised an initial shipment of 
“emergency energy assistance” in the form of 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil to 
be followed in the next phase by up to 1 million tons of heavy fuel oil or their 
equivalent following denuclearization. 
strategic jockeying over energy supplies in the region and the 
potential for political or even military conflict as a result. 
Yet the energy agenda for both North Korea and the region 
is by no means straightforward and is littered with potential 
pitfalls.  North  Korea  has  repeatedly  asserted  its  Article  IV 
right under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to a peace-
ful nuclear program and has continually revisited the issue of 
the light water reactors (LWRs) that were promised under the 
Agreed Framework. These reactors faced difficulties and delays 
in construction and now stand—unfinished—as a testament to 
the risks of large-scale, politically motivated projects. The most 
thorough analyses of the LWR project concludes that they are 
a costly and inappropriate way of meeting North Korea’s vast 
energy needs; given the poor state of North Korea’s electricity 
grid, the energy generated by LWRs might even have to be 
exported! (Hayes et al. 2002, 9–28) 
Nonetheless, Pyongyang is likely to return to this issue 
either as a possible security hedge or as a bargaining tactic for 
extracting resources, for example, through tabling an “LWR 
equivalent” package. These discussions should not simply be 
deferred to a later date, as the United States did at the time of the 
September 2005 Statement of Principles; this strategy sends a 
misleading signal. Rather these demands should be rechanneled 
altogether into other well-considered proposals that both are 
more cost effective and more directly complement the reform 
process: encouraging the development of energy markets and 
appropriate pricing; reducing waste; rehabilitating coal supply 
and transport; opening the energy sector to foreign investment; 
and developing small-scale renewable energy sources (Hayes 
2003). In all these efforts, the engagement of the private sector 
should be a consideration, not simply to defray the economic 
costs but to encourage the North Korean reform process. 
Beyond the rehabilitation of North Korea’s energy sector, 
attention has been given to more wide-ranging ventures that 
might engage all the parties in the region including regional 
power  grid  interconnection  and  the  development  of  oil  or 
gas pipeline networks.13 Yet these ideas face daunting techni-
cal constraints (for example, with respect to interconnection), 
extraordinarily high capital costs, and very long time frames 
for  public  and  private  investment  to  gel.  Moreover,  both 
pipelines and grid interconnection remain vulnerable to the 
hold-up problem: that North Korea could easily disrupt and 
render worthless large investments. As a result, these larger 
infrastructure ideas seem to be longer-range prospects rather 
than plausible starting points. 
13. See, in particular, Babson (2002, 20–23).
If North Korea is to evolve 
toward a self-sustaining market-
oriented economy, private-sector 
involvement will be crucial. N u m b e r   Pb0 8 - 4                                                                                                                                                                                       A PrI L   2 0 0 8
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First,  the  NEAPSM  presents  the  participating  govern-
ments with a bureaucratic balancing act. Because of the domi-
nance of foreign policy and security issues, foreign ministries 
will inevitably lead it. Yet economics, finance, trade, energy, 
environment, and transportation ministries normally manage 
the issues we have discussed. While these other bureaucratic 
actors have periodically been represented in the five powers’ 
delegations, North Korea’s participation has been monopolized 
by its foreign ministry. At present this has adversely affected 
substantive discussions in the Economy and Energy Coopera-
tion Working Group and, if allowed to continue, will severely 
impede meaningful economic discussions in the future. The 
five parties should make sustained efforts to engage portions of 
the North Korean bureaucracy that are not typically exposed 
to such discussions, such as ministries involved in economic 
management, the environment, and transport. 
 A second and related challenge is how to maintain high-
level interest across multiple ministries. Periodic ministerials 
will  be  needed  to  maintain  commitment  and  momentum, 
but senior officials already face a proliferation of international 
meetings. All five of the Northeast Asian powers are members 
of  the  Asia  Pacific  Economic  Cooperation  (APEC)  forum, 
whose finance ministers meet annually in the run-up to the 
meetings of heads of governments. It might be possible to orga-
nize economic ministerials related to the NEAPSM around the 
APEC calendar in order to secure high-level involvement. As 
North Korea commits to a course of reform, it would profit 
from being a member of APEC as well and, as with other 
multilateral institutions, might initially gain observer status. 
Third, it is important to think about how the private sector 
may be engaged as a resource. Inviting representatives of major 
firms to discuss their operations, capabilities, and policy inter-
ests could have important educational effects, particularly for 
the North Koreans. Again, piggybacking on the APEC calendar 
may be valuable in this regard, since the business sectors of the 
five powers are already integrated into APEC-related groups 
and activities.  
The most logical way to meet these objectives would be 
to begin with agenda-setting discussions in the context of the 
initial  ministerial  meeting.  These  discussions  would  set  the 
stage for the evolution of the Economy and Energy Coop-
eration Working Group and the widening of both public- and 
private-sector participation through functional working groups 
on the topics we have outlined. 
CoNCluSioN 
A primary, though not exclusive, objective of NEAPSM should 
be the integration of North Korea into the broader regional 
and global economies. Such an opening is a prerequisite to 
institutions, Format, and Procedures
The proposed peace and security mechanism could emerge in 
various ways.1 Given the advantages of moving quickly on 
economic questions if North Korea takes the crucial decision to 
abandon its nuclear program, the Economy and Energy Coop-
eration Working Group seems the most logical nucleus for 
economic discussions, even if it is later superseded or subsumed 
into a new entity. This working group would shift its present 
focus on provision of heavy fuel oil and equivalents to North 
Korea to select items on the broader agenda just outlined. 
We have already emphasized that this committee not be 
seen as a forum simply for discussing aid commitments to 
North Korea, particularly if it is desirable to do much of the 
heavy lifting in that regard through existing global and regional 
institutions and bilateral aid efforts. Crafting an agenda that 
combines issues related to North Korea more directly, such 
as energy, with issues of broader regional importance, such as 
transportation, seems crucial.
To do this, the committee should configure itself as a venue 
for a particular kind of technology transfer and socialization: 
a forum to engage North Korea as well as the other parties in 
a discussion of the regional economy, the benefits of a more 
open  trade  and  investment  regime,  and  the  physical,  legal, 
and financial infrastructure that would support the regional 
economy. In this regard, three extremely modest procedural 
proposals might repay the multilateral effort in a more hand-
some way than more elaborate schemes. 
1. The most likely route is that a resolution of the nuclear question is fol-
lowed by a ceremonial ministerial meeting at the foreign ministers level that 
endorses further multilateral steps. The Six Party Talks could itself become 
the new institution, with the established working groups as the nucleus of 
new forms of multilateral cooperation; in this instance, the Economy and 
Energy Cooperation Working Group would expand to consider other issues. 
Alternatively, the Working Group on the Northeast Asia Peace and Security 
Mechanism may be the locus for the negotiation of a new entity that would 
encompass both a new security agenda, such as confidence-building measures, 
as well as the economic issues highlighted here. Finally, the Northeast Asian 
Cooperation Dialogue, currently a track-two effort, which has considered 
economic issues in its own working groups, could be transformed into an 
intergovernmental entity.
The public sector clearly has 
a critical role in providing 
depoliticized technical assistance 
and financing for infrastructural 
rehabilitation and encouraging 
the reform process.N u m b e r   Pb0 8 - 4     A PrI L   2 0 0 8
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the country’s economic renewal and resolution of its chronic 
humanitarian problems. Deepened economic interdependence 
would also embed North Korea in relations that could reduce 
the likelihood of disruptive behavior. Yet attainment of these 
hoped-for  outcomes  depend  crucially  on  the  nature  of  the 
economic ties that develop and are by no means assured. The 
modalities  of  engagement  are  important  not  only  in  direct 
economic terms but also on how they affect the trajectory of 
North Korea’s political and economic development. 
For such engagement to be fruitful and politically sustain-
able, it must emphasize reform in North Korea and the inter-
national private sector’s involvement in the country’s economic 
revival. Otherwise the multilateral project risks becoming yet 
another costly and ultimately unsuccessful initiative neither 
delivering  the  expected  economic  benefits  nor  encouraging 
North Korea’s internal change in a constructive direction; as 
we have argued, such a mechanism could even have perverse 
effects on the reform process. 
Yet at the same time, the public sector clearly has a critical 
role in providing depoliticized technical assistance and financ-
ing  for  infrastructural  rehabilitation  and  encouraging  the 
reform process itself. We are skeptical about reproducing on the 
subregional level the capacities of existing global and regional 
institutions  such  as  the World  Bank  or  ADB.  The  existing 
institutional framework is sufficiently flexible to accommodate 
major  subregional  initiatives  without  reconstituting  institu-
tions from scratch. Grandiose proposals such as a Northeast 
Asia free trade area will likely distract from more incremental 
projects, which could serve as the building blocks for more 
expansive initiatives further down the road.
However, functional working groups on some of the topics 
we have outlined—the environment, maritime transport, tech-
nical barriers to trade, road and rail links, and in the future 
perhaps energy—could provide the locus for integrating multi-
lateral and bilateral assistance with increased private involve-
ment. Moreover, these issues engage not only North Korea but 
the other five parties as well. 
Apart from its intrinsic difficulty, this agenda poses some 
specific bureaucratic challenges as well. Foreign ministries will 
inevitably take the lead in developing NEAPSM; indeed, lead-
ership at the ministerial level or even higher will be essential if 
the process is to gain ground. But the implementation of the 
economic agenda will require high-level coordination across a 
variety of ministries. North Korea has proved problematic in 
this regard thus far. Moreover, given the importance of private-
sector involvement in achieving sustainable economic develop-
ment in North Korea, modalities will have to be developed to 
integrate the private sector fully.  
It bears underlining by way of conclusion that the entire 
Northeast Asian economic agenda depends on the resolution of 
the nuclear issue. The governments of the region will not move 
beyond temporizing support to avoid a North Korean collapse 
until North Korea denuclearizes. Nor will the private sector 
engage in any major way until the nuclear issue is resolved. 
In the absence of a supportive diplomatic environment, North 
Korean aspects of the broader economic agenda will not come 
to fruition.
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